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This paper explores the factors influencing the pricing behaviour of full-service carriers in 
European hub-to-hub markets. Drawing on a 2009 dataset containing route and airfare 
information, we establish an econometric model to estimate the impact of route structure, 
alliances, and market concentration on the pricing of European full-service carriers in these 
markets. The results suggest that alliances on routes connecting two primary hubs, airport 
concentration, market share inequality and competition from low-cost carriers influence average 
airfares of full-service carriers in the European hub-to-hub markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Air transport deregulation in Europe has led to dramatic changes in the network configuration 
and business models of erstwhile national carriers. First, they have implemented or intensified 
the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks by concentrating traffic and flights around their hubs to 
accomplish network economies (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; Button, 2002; Caves et al., 1984; 
Janic and Reggiani, 2002). Second, sophisticated revenue management techniques have replaced 
the traditional regulated pricing mechanisms. Offering more differentiated products - such as in-
flight entertainment, VIP waiting lounges, and other ‘frills’ - has gradually transformed national 
carriers into so-called ‘full-service carriers’ (FSCs) (Tretheway, 2011). Third, the industry has been 
consolidated via cross-border mergers to address the excess capacity caused by establishing too 
many airlines in the outdated flag-carrier system (Brueckner and Pels, 2005), as well as through 
establishing global alliances (Benacchio, 2008; Doganis, 1994). In addition, the emergence of low-
cost carriers (LCCs) has been a competitive challenge for FSCs due to the former carriers’ well-
known cost advantages (Alderighi et al., 2012). These changes force FSCs in Europe to constantly 
(re)examine their pricing strategies in order to achieve profitability in what have become 
(relatively more) liberalized markets. 
The literature examining the pricing strategies of FSCs in Europe is not as extensive as the one 
focused on the aviation market in the United States. Some of the exceptions include research on 1) 
flights from Nice Airport (France) to 9 European countries (Giaume and Guillou, 2004), 2) 
domestic routes and airport-pairs between the United Kingdom and 14 European countries (Piga 
and Bachis, 2007), and 3) city-pairs between Italy and the main destinations in the UK, Germany 
and the Netherlands (Alderighi et al., 2012). As a consequence, to the best of our knowledge there 
has been no research exclusively devoted to how carriers determine airfares in the emerging 
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European hub-to-hub (HH) markets, where both origin and destination are to some degree 
dominated by a FSC. 
An analysis of pricing in European HH markets is relevant for three reasons. First, hubs are 
typically located in Metropolitan Regions characterized by large populations, major levels of 
economic development, and an economic structure that is conducive to business travel (Dijkstra, 
2009). Carriers operating HH routes can therefore not only expect to realize economies of density, 
but also capture more high-yield business travellers (Neal, 2011). Second, hubs assume different 
service levels in individual FSCs’ networks, i.e. the so-called ‘hub hierarchy’ that is also emerging 
in the US (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; Burghouwt and Hakfoort, 2001; Dennis, 2005; Derudder 
and Witlox, 2009; Frenken et al., 2004; Malighetti et al., 2009; Thompson, 2002). Burghouwt (2007), 
for instance, clusters airports into 1st tier, 2nd tier and 3rd tier hubs based on the number of 
weighted indirect connections in a carrier’s network, while Malighetti et al. (2009) distinguish 
between ‘worldwide hubs’, ‘hubs’ and ‘secondary gates’ based on traffic volume, destination of 
connections, connectivity and topology of service. The ensuing ‘hub hierarchy’ implies that the 
routes connecting different levels of hubs may vary in their pricing: routes involving more 
dominant hubs can in principle be related with higher airfares because of ‘hub premiums’ 
(Vowles, 2006; Zhang et al., 2013).  
Third, strategic alliances have complicated the route structure of HH networks. European FSCs 
have over time joined one of the three global alliances, thus leading to the development of 
explicit and implicit multi-hub-and-spoke networks: carriers extend their reach by interlinking 
each other’s networks (often via their hubs), so that the scope of their network grows without 
having to internally extend their own networks. Alliance carriers can, as a consequence, increase 
frequencies on their nonstop HH routes to facilitate customers, especially time-sensitive business 
travellers. Doganis (2006), for instance, found that the Lufthansa-SAS alliance increased daily 
departures between Frankfurt and Copenhagen for both carriers. As a consequence, carriers that 
do not ally on HH routes may lose competitive advantages comparing to allied carriers, so that 
the resulting market concentration can be expected to play an important role in explaining price 
discrimination (Borenstein, 1989; Piga and Bachis, 2007).  
The emerging ‘hub hierarchy’, the growing importance of alliances and their combined impact 
(i.e., a route connected by two hubs with different levels of hubness may also be an allied route) 
gives rise to an inherently complex European HH network. This raises questions on the major 
factors influencing the pricing strategies of FSCs serving the hub markets. The objective of this 
paper, therefore, is to investigate to what extent the emerging hub hierarchy, strategic alliances 
and the ensuing landscapes of market concentration influence the price-setting of FSCs in the 
European HH markets. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
previous studies on how alliances and market structure determine airfares and yield in the US 
and European airline industry. Section 3 defines the European HH network, and introduces our 
data and methods. Section 4 presents an analysis of the complex market structure of the 
European HH markets, and examines how route structure, alliances and market concentration 
influence the pricing strategies of FSCs. In section 5, we summarize the main implications of our 
analysis and outline some avenues for further research.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Hub dominance and airfares in HH markets 
Hub-and-spoke networks are associated with the dominance of a hub airport by one or, 
occasionally, two carriers (Borenstein, 1992). If a carrier provides a large number of competitive 
indirect connections (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005) or connects large volumes of transfer 
passengers (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005), then this carrier is said to ‘dominate’ its hub airport. 
The debate about the relationship between hub dominance and airfares rests on the question 
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whether carriers can wield market power by charging higher airfares on routes from/to their 
hubs than on other routes. There is no consensus as to whether a carrier’s pricing power at its 
hub airport can be conveyed to all routes involving the dominant airport, so that this relationship 
is discussed at both the airport and the route level to obtain unbiased estimations.  
In US airline markets, researchers had found that the market power exercised by carriers has not 
been undermined since deregulation. Borenstein (1989) found that a carrier dominating at both 
the airport and the route level has the ability to charge higher fares, whereby the sources of this 
market power originate from 1) the dominant carriers’ ability to deter the entry of potential 
competitors by controlling airport facilities, as well as 2) the marketing devices such as frequent 
flyer programs (FFP). However, Evans and Kessides (1993) found that dominance at the airport 
level, but not the route level, can confer substantial market power upon the carrier when 
unexplained inter-route heterogeneity is considered. Aircraft can be switched relatively easily 
and costlessly between different routes making these routes naturally contestable, whereas 
airport facilities, product differentiation barriers arising from FFPs and other impediments make 
these harder to contest. More recently, researchers have offered new evidence for US markets and 
found that a carrier dominating at the route level can also charge higher fares (Fischer and 
Kamerschen, 2003; Stavins, 2001).  
Marín (1995) was the first to address the issue in the European context and found that, in contrast 
to the US situation, European carriers tended to compete in terms of prices by exploiting cost 
advantages after liberalization. Captain and Sickles (1997) further found that the reasons why 
some ‘flag carriers’ cannot exploit such cost advantages is due to technically inefficient use of 
inputs and high labour wages rather than wielding market power between 1976 and 1990. 
However, it is clear that these studies deal with the earlier stages of European aviation 
deregulation. As the European aviation sector has gone through dramatic changes in the last 
decades, the impact of market dominance on airfares has also been altered by factors such as the 
proliferation of low-cost carriers (LCCs). Piga and Bachis (2007) concluded that the impact of 
market dominance on fares in European airline market depends on the type of carriers (i.e. FSCs 
versus LCCs). FSCs’ dominance at an airport plays a crucial role only for the fares associated with 
a particular set of booking days, i.e. the late booking dates, whereas LCCs’ dominance at an 
airport is highly correlated with fares on any booking day before departure due to their ability to 
operate at lower costs. Dominance at the route level enables FSCs to exercise market power, but 
limits LCCs’ ability to charge higher fares only for late booking fares. They also argue that the 
limited size of many ‘natural monopoly’ routes contribute to the route dominance enjoyed by 
European carriers. 
2.2 Alliances and airfares in HH markets 
An alliance can increase the market share and market power of alliance carriers at their hubs, and 
reduce or eliminate competition on specific routes. However, when alliances or mergers 
significantly reduce competition in the relevant markets, the European Commission has imposed 
conditions such as giving up airport slots or route licenses to encourage the entry of new carriers 
(Doganis, 2006).The vast majority of dense intra-European routes are short-haul routes with less 
than two-and-a-half hours of flying time, implying that alternatives via transfer routes are not 
very attractive. Joining in an alliance can therefore very effectively reduce competition on those 
routes by turning the previous duopoly into a de facto monopoly (Doganis, 2006). However, the 
degree to which alliance partners (ab)use their strengthened dominance to charge higher fares on 
their hub-to-hub routes remains unclear. Oum et al. (2000) study 22 international airlines for the 
1986-95 period and find that partner airlines lowered prices by 1.3% after entering an alliance, 
and ascribe this result to the reduced cost because of efficiency or productivity gains. They 
particularly find that an airline with a longer average route length charged lower prices than that 
with a short average route length due to the competitive advantage of longer routes (e.g., 
reduced fuel consumption). At the same time, researchers have found that fares in markets 
served by an alliance were higher than those in non-alliance markets because of reduced 
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competition, as in the SAS-Swissair alliance (Youssef and Hansen, 1994) and the Air France-KLM 
merger (Brueckner and Pels, 2005). Meanwhile, Wan et al. (2009) investigate the impact of airline 
alliances on airfares on transatlantic HH routes, and come to the conclusion that the net effect on 
airfares is uncertain as it depends on the ability of an alliance to coordinate fares.  
2.3 Market concentration and airfares in HH markets 
A carrier’s pricing strategy is driven not only by the internal carrier-specific considerations but 
also by the structure of external markets. As a market (i.e., individual airport-pair market) is 
comprised of carriers, passengers, air travel products, and competing mass travel modes such as 
railway links, the external market structure in which the carriers are operating depends upon 
four aspects: 1) the number of carriers and passengers, 2) ease of market entry, adaptation, and 
exit, 3) the extent of product differentiation or distinctiveness, and 4) the availability and cost of 
information (Holloway, 2008).  
The structure of the European airline markets can in practice be mainly categorized through three 
types, based on the number of carriers: monopoly (i.e., one carrier), duopoly (i.e., two carriers) 
and oligopoly (i.e., more than two carriers) (Alderighi et al., 2012). However, the number of 
carriers per se on a route is not the best measure of market structure and the competitive 
behaviour of carriers as it does not evaluate concentration (i.e., the market share distribution of 
carriers) (Giaume and Guillou, 2004; Shepherd, 1999). The concept of concentration has been 
extensively applied to represent market structure in research focused on the relationship between 
market structure and pricing. Aiming to reflect the entire market share distribution of carriers in 
a single indicator, researchers frequently use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to quantify 
market concentration (Hannan, 1997). 
The impact of route HHI on prices can be mixed and depends on the geographical areas. In the 
US airline markets, researchers have found that increases in route HHI raise prices to some 
degree as a few carriers in a concentrated market may collude more easily to charge higher prices 
(Borenstein, 1989; Chi and Koo, 2009; Evans and Kessides, 1993). However, a negative 
relationship between route HHI and prices also occurs when the dominant carrier enjoys 
technological advantages over its rivals and forces the other carriers to reduce prices to compete 
(Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003). In the European airline markets, Piga and Bachis (2007) found 
that prices were raised by FSCs and LCCs as route HHI increased, but only for the prices 
associated with late booking days. Giaume and Guillou (2004) observed a negative relationship 
between route HHI and prices in the European markets and attributed it to the high inequality of 
market share leading to strong price competition between carriers. 
These findings suggest that the impact of changing market structure on fares for European 
markets will probably not be a copy of the US case, which calls for a systematic appraisal of its 
role in European aviation markets. Moreover, we also consider the impact of LCCs’ presence at 
secondary airports and high-speed train (HST) competition on airfares, which to date are rarely 
incorporated in a pricing model related to European market. 
3. Data collection and descriptive analysis 
3.1 Data collection procedure 
A first step is to define the geographical scope of our research. As there are no generally 
recognized boundaries of ‘Europe’, the scope of this study is confined to those Western/Central 
parts of Europe where the air transport industry is relatively more liberalized and developed. 
This paper considers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  
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The second step is to define European FSCs and their established hubs as well as secondary 
airports close to these hubs. Researchers have long defined all ‘flag carriers’4 of the countries 
listed above as FSCs in Europe (Alderighi et al., 2012; Burghouwt et al., 2003). However, on-going 
deregulation has broadened the differences amongst these erstwhile flag carriers, as can be seen 
in the cases of Aer Lingus’s (i.e., Ireland’s flag carrier) transformation into a LCC (Barrett, 2006; 
O' Connell and Williams, 2005; Wallace et al., 2006) and the demise of Sabena (i.e., Belgium’s 
former flag carrier) in 2001. Moreover, some flag carriers, such as Icelandair, Luxair and Olympic 
Airlines, did not join one of the major airline alliances. As per our research objective, FSCs are 
defined as the current flag carriers of countries locating in Western and Central Europe which 
run a complex business model by bundling a series of services, and have also joined one of the 
three global alliances (i.e., Star, Oneworld and SkyTeam) at the time of our research (column 2, 
table 1). Next, we identify these FSCs’ hubs, thus establishing the hub-to-hub network in Europe. 
As the main purpose of a FSC’s hub is to concentrate flights through synchronized waves and 
reroute passengers, our working definition of hubs in the European airline market focuses on the 
number of competitive indirect connections as presented by Burghouwt (2007). In his work, hubs 
are defined as airports with more than 200 indirect connections per day5 and served by FSCs. A 
classification scheme based on the number of indirect connections is then applied to distinguish 
between ‘primary hubs’ (>2500) and ‘secondary hubs’ (200-2500). Table 1 presents an overview of 
the European FSCs’ hubs and their adjacent secondary airports6. This provides the scope of our 
study as the HH market is taken to consist of all connections where both origin and destination 
are hubs (see Figure 1). As a result of the presence of this ‘hub hierarchy’, European HH network 
consists of three different types of routes, i.e., primary-primary (PP), primary-secondary (PS), and 
secondary-secondary (SS) routes. 
 
Table 1. Categorization of hubs for European FSCs and list of secondary airports 
Hub Airport Carrier 
Number of weighted indirect 
connections per day (20037) Secondary Airport 
Primary (8)    
Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Air France 14005 Beauvais (BVA) 
Frankfurt (FRA) Lufthansa 13616 Frankfurt Hahn (HHN) 
London Heathrow 
(LHR) British Airways 9439 
London Luton (LTN), London 
Stansted (STN) 
Amsterdam (AMS) KLM 8713 Rotterdam (RTM) 
Madrid (MAD) Iberia 6941  
Munich (MUC) Lufthansa 4184  
4 A flag carrier (also known as national carrier) is one that is substantially owned and effectively controlled by 
nationals of that state in the EU (Doganis, 2001; Barrett, 2006). However, waves of deregulation and privatization 
have changed the ownership of some flag carriers whereby they have become partially or even fully owned by 
the private sector. However, most of them are still considered to be flag carriers today as they are often 
interpreted as a  sign of their home country’s international presence (Smith, 1991). 
5 Burghouwt (2007) considered all the airports having indirect connections in an FSC’s network as hubs or 
primary nodes. However, we set a minimum threshold as 200 indirect connections per day as this tends to select 
more important hubs through which airlines strive to establish a wave-system structure. 
6 Secondary airports are defined as airports located less than 75 miles away from the hubs. 
7 Burghouwt (2007)’s work to the best of our knowledge is the most detailed source on the hub-and-spoke 
practices of FSCs in Europe. Even though this classification was developed using pre-2005 data, it is still a 
valuable source because FSCs and their hubs tend to have longstanding, symbiotic relationships. Only in the 
cases of bankruptcy or the very drastic decision to fundamentally restructure their network, it would be possible 
for an FSC to either abandon a hub (Redondi et al., 2012) or establish a new one (Düdden, 2006). For the sake of 
data consistency, we investigated the network evolution of route maps of FSCs, and found that Alitalia was the 
only example here through its partially abandoning of Milan Malpensa (MXP) in 2008. However, excluding MXP 
from our dataset did not alter the results of our improved model. Taken together, then, Burghouwt’s classification 
is still relevant for our research, in spite of it predating our own analytical framework. 
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Copenhagen (CPH) SAS Scandinavian 2576 Malmo (MMX) 
Vienna (VIE) Austrian 2553  
Secondary (10)    
Rome Fiumicino (FCO) Alitalia 2384 Ciampino (CIA) 
Barcelona (BCN) Iberia 2128 Girona (GRO) 
Milan Malpensa (MXP) Alitalia 1946 Linate (LIN), Bergamo (BGY) 
Oslo (OSL) SAS Scandinavian 1139 Torp (TRF) 
London Gatwick (LGW) British Airways 979 London Luton (LTN), London Stansted (STN) 
Helsinki (HEL) Finnair 957  
Lisbon (LIS) TAP Air Portugal 792  
Paris Orly (ORY) Air France 709 Beauvais (BVA) 
Brussels (BRU) Brussels8 452 Charleroi (CRL) 
Dusseldorf (DUS) Lufthansa 214 Kolon/Bonn (CGN) 
Source: Burghouwt (2007) 
 
Figure 1.  Non-stop connections between hubs of the European FSCs 
 
We also identified types of carriers other than FSCs (e.g., LCCs and regional carriers) to examine 
the overall market structure. As not all the carriers registered in Europe can readily enter the 
European HH markets due to high entry barriers, we collected a list of carriers that actually 
served the HH markets (i.e., with a market share larger than 1%) in May 2009 from our database 
(see below). By comparing the combined lists of LCCs recently developed by Dobruszkes (2009) 
and Klophaus et al. (2012), we establish a list of LCCs for this study. All the other carriers are 
then defined as regional carriers (RECs)9. The overview of carriers is represented in table 2. 
 
8 Brussels Airlines is the new flag carrier of Belgium. It started operations in 2007 after the merger between 
between SN Brussels Airlines (i.e., the former national carrier of Belgium, inherited from Sabena) and Virgin 
Express. 
9 Even though some RECs are partial- or fully-owned subsidiaries of FSCs, we treat them separately as 1) their 
combined market shares would cause severe anti-competition issues due to monopolistic or duopolistic 
tendencies; 2) the integration may mask the roles played by RECs in reducing prices on routes with fierce 
competition from LCCs or those with unanticipated schedule disruptions (Forbes and Lederman, 2007). 
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Table 2. Overview of carriers and alliance for FSCs 
Carrier 
Type 
Carrier Name 
FSCs Air France (SkyTeam), Alitalia (SkyTeam), Austrian (Star), British Airways (OneWorld), Brussels 
(Star), Finnair (OneWorld), Iberia (OneWorld), KLM (SkyTeam), Lufthansa (Star), SAS Scandinavian 
(Star), TAP Air Portugal (Star) 
LCCs Aer Lingus, Air Europa Lineas Aereas, Air Berlin, EasyJet, Germanwings, Niki, Norwegian Air 
Shuttle, Spanair, Transavia.com, Vueling, Ryanair, Wind Jet 
RECs Adria Airways, Aigle Azur, Air Comet, Air Dolomiti, Blue1, BMI british midland, Brit Air, Cimber 
Sterling, Eurowings, Lufthansa Cityline, Regional, SAS Norge, Tyrolean Airways 
Note: Alliance membership for FSCs is shown between parentheses. 
 
The main dataset used in this paper is collected through a research cooperation with Sabre 
Airline Solutions, and contains information drawn from Airport Data Intelligence (ADI) on actual 
bookings for different carriers. The Sabre ADI has at least one major advantage when analysing 
pricing and scheduling in the airline industry: it seeks to establish a complete dataset by 
adjusting and calibrating data from 1) global distribution systems (GDS), 2) travel agencies, 3) 
direct bookings, low-cost carriers, charter operations and 4) other non-IATA distribution 
channels. Sabre’s ADI database provides the required data for the proposed pricing analysis, 
including information at the route and carrier level of passenger numbers, revenue, cabin class 
and distance. It also indicates the intermediate stops when connecting services are available. The 
units of observation in our analysis are the non-stop connections between the 18 hubs in the 
overall network ‘produced’ by the 11 European FSCs given in Figure 1. An observed route is 
selected only if its monthly traffic volume is at least 100 passengers, and a carrier is considered to 
serve the route only if its market share is at least 1%. The data used in this paper is for May 2009. 
In addition, the population of the hub cities is obtained from www.World-Gazetteer.com. The 
data related to the presence of LCCs on competing routes whereby either endpoints are 
connected by secondary airports are collected from www.skyscanner.net10. Finally, HST data are 
collected from the official website of HST companies in Europe, such as TGV, ICE, Eurostar and 
other companies. 
 Exploratory analysis of market structure 3.2
Market concentration depends on the actual structure of individual hub airport-pair markets. 
Given the complex nature of market structure in the EU (partly because of the shorter distances 
between hubs and the alliance formation), we first perform a descriptive analysis of market 
structure before proceeding to the econometric analysis. 
Market structure by route type 
As competition has not been homogeneous at the route level in Europe (Giaume and Guillou, 
2004), it is necessary to analyze the market structure for each HH route separately. Table 3 shows 
that European HH markets exhibit three types of market structure in terms of the number and 
type of carriers: monopoly (10% of routes), duopoly (49% of routes) and oligopoly (42% of 
routes)11. Previous research carried out by Alderighi et al. (2012) has shown that the entry of 
10 This data were not available for the year 2009 in our Sabre dataset. Skyscanner providing information about 
routes and carriers allows us to control for the impact of LCCs competition at secondary airports, even though the  
online data are about scheduled flights in 2014. Competing routes are assumed to be actually served by LCCs 
only if nonstop return services are provided every week in May, 2014. The website was accessed on 4th April, 
2014. 
 
11 For instance, Barcelona-Frankfurt is a monopolistic route as Lufthansa is the only carrier serving this route at 
the time of data collection. Amsterdam-Charles de Gaulle is a duopolistic routes served by two carriers – Air 
France and KLM. The oligopoly markets have three or more carriers in services. Note that from an alliance 
perspective the CDG-AMS link will be monopolistic. 
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LCCs has increased the competition of the European aviation market. They particularly 
distinguish between symmetric duopoly (two FSCs) and asymmetric duopoly (one FSC and one 
LCC), and also between oligopolistic routes with or without the presence of LCCs. Drawing on 
their categorization method, we find that 11 duopolistic routes and 28 oligopolistic routes have 
been entered by LCCs. These fundamental statistics indicate that European HH markets are 1) 
served by few carriers and characterized by high concentration, and 2) penetrated by LCCs.  
Table 3. An overview of market structure by route structure  
 Monopolistic 
routes 
Duopolistic routes Oligopolistic routes Total 
FSC FSC&LCC FSC&REC FSC FSC&LCC FSC&REC FSC&LCC&REC 
PP 2 11 0 2 1 2 4 4 26 
PS 5 13 8 7 1 9 6 6 55 
SS 3 2 3 3 1 6 1 1 20 
Total 10 26 11 12 3 17 11 11 101 
 
The presence of LCCs and RECs indicates the possible inequality of market shares among 
carriers. Route concentration measured by a regular HHI (i.e., the sum of squared market shares) 
may, therefore, be inadequate to represent concentration, as it does not separate the effects of the 
number of carriers and share inequality12. We thus use the decomposed HHI to measure the 
market concentration when both asymmetries of market shares and the number of competitors 
on a route should be accounted for. The decomposed HHI index is measured as: Decomposed HHI = H1 + H2 =  CV2 N⁄ + 1 N⁄           
   (1) 
Where CV is the coefficient of variation of market shares, and N is the number of carriers on a 
route. The first part of this equation (H1) is of particular importance as it represents the market 
share inequality of carriers on a route, while the second part (H2) describes the value of HHI 
when all the carriers have equal market share (Laderman, 1995). 
The impact of alliances on airfares 
Alliances allow FSCs to form multi-hub-and-spoke networks and cooperate with carriers in the 
same alliance. 34 out of 101 routes in our study are connected by the same alliance’s hubs in our 
study (table 4). We categorize six types of routes by considering both the degree of hubness and 
alliances: PP*Alliance (e.g., FRA-CPH), PP*NonAlliance (e.g., FRA-CDG), PS*Alliance (e.g., FRA-
OLS), PS*NonAlliance (e.g., FRA-FCO), SS*Alliance (e.g., OLS-LIS) and SS*NonAlliance (e.g., 
FCO-OLS). For instance, as Lufthansa, SAS Scandinavian, Brussels and TAP Air Portugal all 
belong to the Star alliance, FRA-CPH is thus a PP*Alliance route whereby FRA and CPH are the 
primary hubs of Lufthansa and SAS Scandinavian, respectively. The same approach was applied 
to the other route types. Based on the disaggregated market share of the carriers in the same 
alliance, five allied routes are monopolistic and 21 are duopolistic. When the market shares of the 
alliance carriers are aggregated, about 90% of alliance routes are monopolistic or duopolistic.  
 
 
 
 
12 Our econometric analysis also proves that the regular HHI index does not have significant impact on fares. In 
addition, the different effects of number of carriers and market share inequality on fares also indicate that the 
decomposed HHI is more appropriate to represent market concentration in this study. 
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Table 4. The effects of alliances on market structure by route type 
 Monopolistic  
routes 
Duopolistic routes Oligopolistic routes Total 
Before alliance     
PP*Alliance 2 4 2 8 
PS*Alliance 2 13 5 20 
SS*Alliance 1 4 1 6 
Total 5 21 8 34 
After alliance     
PP*Alliance 6 2 0 8 
PS*Alliance 9 9 2 20 
SS*Alliance 3 2 1 6 
Total 18 13 3 34 
 
We also carried out an exploratory analysis to examine whether allied carriers exercise pricing 
power when their joint market share increases. Table 5 shows that the alliance carriers charge 
significant higher fares only on PP routes, but not on the other types of routes. There are two 
possible reasons. First, the raised market concentration on the other types of routes is offset by 
the economies of density, resulting in statistically insignificant impact on airfares. Second, allied 
carriers coordinate their pricing decisions on the main PP routes, implying that they primarily 
wield market power on PP routes. 
Table 5. The t-test results for average fares by route type 
Average fares N Mean $ Std.dev. Std.err. t-value 
PP route      
Same-alliance routes  8  188.75  25.16  8.89  3.964  
(0.001)  Different-alliance routes 18  151.02  21.16  4.99  
Difference   37.73    9.52    
PS route      
Same-alliance routes 20  170.70  58.33  13.04  1.22  
Different-alliance routes 35  153.49  45.09  7.62  (0.227)  
Difference   17.21    14.08    
SS route      
Same-alliance route 6  134.73  46.14  18.84  -0.737  
Other routes 14  158.46  72.15  19.28  (0.471)  
Difference   -23.73    32.19    
Note: H0: mean (diff) = 0; Ha: mean (diff) > 0; the significance level is shown between parentheses. 
 
The results in table 5 suggest that market concentration influences airfares, but previous research 
has shown that without taking mediating demand and cost variables into account such simple 
comparative approach can be misleading (Borenstein, 1989; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005). In the 
next section, we therefore establish an econometric model to assess the influence of hub 
hierarchies, alliances and concentration on airfares by controlling for these potentially 
intervening variables. 
4. Econometric analysis 
4.1 The empirical model 
We establish an econometric model that explains the variability of earnings on non-stop HH 
routes in the intra-European air passenger markets. Earnings are measured through average one-
way fares, which serve as the dependent variable in our model. The independent variables in the 
model combine demand, cost, route structure, and market structure variables. Continuous 
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variables (i.e., population, business/economy traffic mix, distance and average fare) are 
transformed into their natural logarithms to reduce the impact of outlying observations and 
facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities. The empirical pricing model for the 
HH network is specified as follows: Ln(Avgfare) = β0 + β1Ln(Population) + β2RegionalEffects + β3Ln(Business) + β4Ln(Distance)+ 𝛽𝛽5PP + 𝛽𝛽6PS + 𝛽𝛽7AllianceRoutes + β8(PP ∗ AllianceRoutes)+ β9(PS ∗ AllianceRoutes) + β10OneStop + 𝛽𝛽11Ln(AirportHHI) + β12H1+ β13H2 + β14 LCCs + β15LCCSecondary + β16 HST 
                                                                 (2) 
Where: 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are the estimated coefficients for the independent variables. 
Avgfare is the average one-way fares measured by the total revenues divided by the total number 
of passengers of all the European FSCs on a route. 
Demand Variables 
Population is the average population of cities where the hub airports locate, indicating the 
potential market size of a given route. The impact of Population on airfares can be mixed. On the 
one hand, larger population imply that more people will buy air tickets to travel, thereby 
increasing prices. On the other hand, higher population enables carriers to reduce prices by using 
larger and more cost efficient aircraft (Wan et al., 2009). The estimated influence of population 
cannot be predetermined. 
The RegionalEffects variable is designed to control the unobserved regional effects in nature, for 
instance, warm weather (Morrison, 2001) or the coastal mass tourism belt in Southern Europe 
(Bramwell, 2004). Specifically, Wan et al. (2009) defined airports locating in “European countries 
on the Mediterranean Sea coast and Portugal” as vacation destinations. We, therefore, control 
routes whereby either of the two endpoints is located in Barcelona or Lisbon to account for 
regional effects. A negative relationship between regional effects and airfares is expected. 
Business (i.e. a traffic mix continuous variable) is measured as the proportion of passengers 
travelling for business on a HH route13. We aggregated four types of tickets (i.e., first, business, 
discount business, and premium coach) together as ‘business’ passengers because carriers have 
largely blurred the distinction among these categories of premium tickets (Lee and Luengo-
Prado, 2005). Morrison (2001) applied this variable to reflect the adoption of yield management 
techniques by airlines (i.e., charging business travelers higher fares than leisure travelers) and 
found that fares are 28 % higher on routes with 75% business travelers than comparable routes 
with 25% business travelers. The US Department of Transportation (2001) also concluded that 
high fares in hub markets can be explained by passenger mix when routes are lack of price 
competition. HH markets have a large proportion of demand coming from business travellers 
with a relatively high ‘willingness-to-pay’, making the demand curves for these markets steeper 
than is the case in respect of more price-elastic markets (Holloway, 2008). In other words, the 
price increase in HH markets may theoretically lead to a relatively small demand decline. The 
expected sign for business traffic indicator is thus positive. 
Cost Variable 
Distance is the non-stop distance (measured in miles) between two hubs. As distance increases, 
average fares can be expected to rise since carriers’ operating costs with regard to fuel, in-flight 
service and wages will increase (Borenstein, 1989; Windle and Dresner, 1995; Vowles, 2006). The 
expected sign for Distance is positive. 
13 We use metropolitan-level data instead of airport-level data in 2008 (i.e., an earlier year) to measure ‘BUSINESS’ 
in order to guarantee its independence and exogeneity, which is similar to the setting of Morrison (2001). 
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Route Structure Variables 
We include two variables PP and PS to account for the ‘hub hierarchy’ effects and one variable 
AllianceRoutes to consider the impact of alliances on fares14. The expected sign for those variables 
are difficult to predetermine as discussed in the literature review. 
In order to study the interactive effect of alliances and route structure on airfares, we also 
establish two variables based on the exploratory analysis above. The 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 
dummy variable represents routes connected by two primary hubs served by carriers within the 
same alliance. As carriers operating on this type of routes may exercise certain pricing power15, 
the expected sign of this variable is positive. PS *AllianceRoutes is a dummy variable detecting the 
effects of alliance carriers serving PS routes. As the pricing power may be offset by the increased 
traffic and economies of density on this type of routes, the expected signs cannot be 
predetermined. 
The OneStop dummy variable represents routes whereby one-stop flights are also available. We 
consider a HH route with more than 1000 one-stop passengers on both directions in May, 2009 as 
a competitive one-stop alternative. The influence of providing indirect service on airfares can be 
complicated. On the one hand, it may reflect carriers’ entry strategy into high-yield routes 
whereby both endpoints are dominated by incumbent carriers and have a positive relationship 
with airfares. This requires the entry carriers to develop strong and competitive hubs capable of 
diverting passengers. On the other hand, a central hub enables its dominant carriers to provide 
competitive indirect flights on long-haul HH routes with strong directionality (i.e., North-South 
or South-East), and thus reduce the prices. In addition, the narrower European market and 
reduced use of hub-and-spoke networks may make ‘hubbing’ insignificant on airfares (Giaume 
and Guillou, 2004). The expected sign of this variable is uncertain. 
Market Structure Variables 
AirportHHI is the simple average of Herfindahl indices at the two endpoints of a route. 
Researchers have found that concentration at the endpoint airports will lead to higher fares 
(Borenstein, 1989; Piga and Bachis, 2007). AirportHHI is expected to be positively associated with 
prices. 
H1 and H2 are the two components of the decomposed HHI index. As more than half of the 
European HH markets are routes where a large FSC competes with a small LCC or REC (table 3), 
the market share distribution of those carriers is highly unequal. The smaller carrier is likely to 
reduce the price to maintain its presence, leading to a strong price competition between carriers 
(Giaume and Guillou, 2004). The sign of H1 is, therefore, expected to be negative. In a market 
characterized by perfect competition, higher market concentration due to a smaller number of 
carriers may increase the airfares on a route. Given that European HH markets appear to be 
imperfectly competitive, H2 may have insignificant impact on airfares.  
The LCCs dummy variable examines the impact of the presence of LCCs. LCCs are taken to be 
present in a market when they collectively have a market share larger than 1% of passengers in a 
market (Ito and Lee, 2003; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005; Windle and Dresner, 1995). The expected 
sign of this variable is negative. 
The LCCSecondary dummy variable investigates the competitive influence of LCCs at secondary 
airports. Extensive literature has proved that this variable has significant negative impact on 
airfares in US airline industry (Brueckner et al., 2013; Morrison, 2001). However, its impact is 
rarely examined and uncertain in European market. Even though FSCs in Europe has perceived 
14 In order to avoid the so-called dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2010), SS and Non-Alliance Routes are chosen 
to be the benchmark group for ‘hub hierarchy’ and ‘Alliances’, respectively, and thus not included in the model. 
15 We use dummy variables instead of market share of the leading carrier to define route dominance as it 
explicitly examines the relationship between route structure resulting from hub hierarchies and pricing. 
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the competitive pressure in prices from LCCs and are willing to adapt to these changes, their 
high cost structure and complex business model seems to hamper their swift transformation and 
response to the direct or adjacent competition from LCCs (Markus, 2004). The expected sign of 
this variable is uncertain. 
HST is a variable examining the competition from high-speed train in Europe. We only consider 
the direct high-speed train connections  including eight HST lines between cities where hubs 
locate (i.e., Paris to Brussels, Amsterdam, Dusseldorf and London; Madrid to Barcelona; London 
to Brussels; Munich to Dusseldorf and Frankfurt). Competition from HSTs may reduce FSCs’ 
airfares due to shorter access time, the ability to hand large passenger volumes and better 
adaption to fluctuations in demand (Roman et al., 2007). However, Dobruszkes (2011) found that 
the ability of HSTs to compete with air transport was limited, particularly on routes with high 
flight frequency. The expected sign of this variable is, therefore, uncertain. 
4.2 Summary statistics of variables 
The summary statistics for all the variables are presented in table 6. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Avgfare ($) 53.70  371.95  158.83  48.96  
Population (thousands) 581  5601  1985  1343  
RegionalEffects 0.00 1.00 0.24  0.43  
Business (%) 1.70  59.13  19.56  14.74  
Distance (miles) 186 1834 683.53  341.94  
PP 0.00 1.00 0.26  0.44  
PS 0.00 1.00 0.54  0.50  
AllianceRoutes 0.00 1.00 0.34  0.48  
PP*AllianceRoutes 0.00 1.00 0.08  0.27  
PS*AllianceRoutes 0.00 1.00 0.20  0.40  
OneStop 0.00 1.00 0.12  0.33  
AirportHHI  1000 4500 2200 600 
H1 0.00 0.67  0.08  0.11  
H2 0.17  1.00 0.47  0.20  
LCCs 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49  
LCCSecondary 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 
HST 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 
# obs 101 
4.3 The econometric methodology 
We perform a diagnostic test for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity to 
produce a robust and unbiased model. First, based on the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable (Baum, 2006), we do not find evidence of a multicollinearity problem. 
Second, as variables in our model are averaged, heteroskedasticity may occur in this situation 
(Baum, 2006), and we therefore report the robust standard errors for both OLS and 2SLS as 
developed by White (1980). Third, based on previous research (Borenstein, 1989; Piga and Bachis, 
2007), we know that the AirportHHI variable may be endogenous, and we therefore apply a two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation method to correct this endogeneity problem. The 
instrument used in the 2SLS is the average airport HHIs in other markets, which is similar to the 
approach of Piga and Bachis (2007). It could be argued that other market structure variables may 
still confront potential endogeneity. However, it is difficult to find an instrument set to correct 
endogeneity in the airline industry given a large number of competition measures in the model, 
especially since the model already includes some route characteristics variables that might 
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otherwise serve as instruments (Brueckner et al., 2013). As a result, we do not correct for the 
potential endogeneity bias of other variables.  
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 7 summarizes the regression results for the OLS and 2SLS models, whereby 9 out of 16 
independent variables are found to be statistically significant, collectively explaining 55% of the 
price-setting of FSCs in the European HH markets. As the results for 2SLS with robust-standard 
errors are more reliable, we focus on these results. 
Table 7. Coefficients for the regression model 
 OLS 2SLS 
Constant 3.449***(1.122) 3.309***(1.041) 
Ln(Population) -0.083*(0.046) -0.082**(0.042) 
RegionalEffects -0.209***(0.061) -0.207***(0.056) 
Ln(Business) 0.094***(0.035) 0.095***(0.032) 
Ln(Distance) 0.189***(0.070) 0.189***(0.064) 
PP -0.012(0.098) -0.013(0.089) 
PS 0.008(0.089) 0.007(0.081) 
AllianceRoutes -0.037(0.120) -0.037(0.109) 
PP*AllianceRoutes 0.276**(0.133) 0.278**(0.121) 
PS*AllianceRoutes 0.091(0.140) 0.092(0.127) 
OneStop 0.197**(0.081) 0.199***(0.074) 
Ln(AirportHHI) 0.180**(0.087) 0.196**(0.087) 
H1 -0.667*(0.381) -0.681**(0.354) 
H2 0.045(0.116) 0.037(0.107) 
LCCs -0.093*(0.056) -0.093*(0.051) 
LCCSecondary -0.023(0.064) -0.024(0.058) 
HST -0.091(0.106) -0.091(0.096) 
R Squared 0.55 0.55 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
     *, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Demand Variables 
The negative coefficient of Population indicates that carriers operating on the European HH routes 
can realize economies of scale by using larger and more cost efficient aircraft. As the average 
population increases 1% in the European HH markets, the prices are predicted to fall by 0.1%16. 
Routes centred on what are identified as predominant ‘vacation destinations’ are negatively 
related to airfares and are about 23% lower than the other routes. We also find that the ‘traffic 
mix’ is indeed a factor in the price setting of European FSCs in their HH markets. The estimates 
show that an increase of 10% in the proportion of business passengers leads to an increase of 
about 0.9% in fares charged by European FSCs. The relative small coefficient may reflect that 
business passengers may be becoming sensitive to fare (Gillen and Morrison, 2005). In the 
European airline markets, researchers have found that business travellers working for small 
16 When both independent and dependent variables are natural logarithmic transformed, back-transformation is 
compulsory to accurately interpret the results. The equation is �(1 + 1%)β − 1� ∗ 100%. For all the dummy 
variables, the equation applied to interpret the results is �eβ − 1� ∗ 100%. 
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companies are more willing to trade in-flight service, frequency and FFP points for lower fares 
than those working for larger companies (Mason, 2001), suggesting a shift of pricing strategies for 
FSCs. 
Cost Variable 
Distance is positively related to the airfares as shorter routes are cheaper to run (in absolute 
terms) than longer ones. An increase of 1% in the route’s length leads to an increase of about 0.2% 
in fares. The elasticity of less than one shows, however, that the airline’s cost of carrying a 
passenger does decrease in relative terms with the distance of his/her trip. 
Route Structure Variables 
Prices are found to be about 32% higher on primary-primary routes operated by carriers within 
the same alliance than the other routes, indicating that alliance carriers wield some pricing power 
due to reduced market competition. The insignificant influence of the other types of alliance 
routes on airfares can be explained by the less intense use of hub-and-spoke network in intra-
European airline markets compared to the US, corroborating the findings of Giaume and Guillou 
(2004). For instance, Paris Orly (ORY) and Brussels (BRU) are de facto specialized switching 
points for African markets rather than intra-European hubs (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005). On 
the other hand, smaller airports have become more important in carrying intra-European traffic. 
Piga and Bachis (2007) found that lower fares are charged by LCCs on the routes from their hubs 
such as Stansted for Ryanair due to cost advantages. 
In addition, the OneStop variable has a positive relationship with airfares, indicating that carriers 
choose high-yield routes to enter by providing one-stop flights17. Overall, prices on HH routes 
with the coexistence of nonstop and one-stop services are 22.1% higher than for the other routes. 
Lufthansa at Frankfurt and Swiss at Zurich contributed most to the transfer traffic on those routes 
due to their strong hub operations. As European FSCs gradually intensify the configuration of 
their hub-and-spoke network with less waiting time and lower routing factor, indirect 
connections can become more attractive and competitive in intra-European markets (Burghouwt 
and de Wit, 2005). 
Market Structure Variables 
As predicted, concentration at the endpoint airports is positively associated with airfares. The 
market concentration measured as the market share inequality (H1) has a negative impact on 
fares, which contrasts with the US experience in which concentration leads to higher airfares. 
Assuming that there are two routes (i.e., route 1 and route 2) whereby each of them is served by 
three carriers, the market shares of the carriers for route 1 are 0.5, 0.25 and 0.25, whereas those for 
route 2 are 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3, respectively. In other words, the distribution of market shares among 
carriers on route 1 is more unequal than that on route 2. Based on equation 1, the value of H1 for 
route 1 (i.e., 0.063) is higher than that for route 2 (i.e., 0.01) by 0.053, implying that the average 
fares charged by FSCs on route1 is 4% (i.e., 0.053 multiplied by the coefficient of H1 in table 7) 
lower than that on route 2. This finding also supports the exploratory analysis of the market 
structure of European HH markets whereby 61% of routes served by FSCs confront competition 
from at least one LCC or REC. The large difference of market share forces the only carrier to 
reduce its prices to compete with FSCs. This can be explained in two aspects. First, when the 
smaller carrier such as a LCC or a REC choose not to follow the general industry price set by the 
large carrier, the latter finds it difficult to execute market power to make its rival ‘suffer’ due to 
the small size of its MSH (Barla, 2000), while at the same time suffering losses by having to 
decrease its price on a large MSH. These effects diminish as MSHs converge, so that prices may 
17 The counterintuitive positive effect of OneStop variable found in this paper also occurred in Brueckner et al. 
(2013) and could be caused by endogeneity bias. When nonstop fares charged by FSCs are too high, other FSCs 
could provide more extensive onestop options for passengers. 
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decrease as the market share inequality rises. Second, at the same price levels, if passengers 
prefer the FSC with a larger capacity or a better service, cutting prices is likely to be the best 
strategy for the LCC or REC to increase its market share (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). 
The presence of LCCs can largely influence FSCs’ pricing decisions in the European HH markets. 
Their head-to-head competition with FSCs drives prices down by 9.7%. Finally, we do not find 
significant impact of competition from LCCs at secondary airports and HSTs on FSCs’ fares.   
6. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper was to explore factors influencing the pricing of the European 
full-service carriers in the specific hub-to-hub markets. We find that five factors (i.e., route type, 
airport concentration, market share inequality, competition from low-cost carriers, and providing 
competitive one-stop alternative routings) contribute to explain the pricing in Europe’s HH 
markets. As a consequence, we conclude that through strategic alliances, FSCs in Europe do 
charge higher fares on the routes connected by their primary hubs. However this finding only 
holds for connections between primary hubs, which may be related to the fact that – in contrast to 
the US market that has a longer history of deregulation and straddles a larger geographic area – 
an extensive multi-hub-and-spoke network does not yet exist (at least in terms of its potential 
pricing consequences).  
Our finding that the market share inequality is negatively related with airfares corroborates the 
results obtained by Giaume and Guillou (2004). The specific characteristics of the European HH 
markets suggest that more new entries should be encouraged to compete with the incumbent 
FSCs. The low-cost carriers function as a main force for driving prices down in the HH markets, 
and will likely continue to influence the more extensive markets due to the enlargement of the 
European Union (i.e. the so-called ‘new Europe, new low-cost air services’ discussed by 
Dobruszkes, 2009).  
Even though nonstop HH routes generally have high barriers to enter, we find that carriers, such 
as Lufthansa and Swiss, who have established strong hubs tend to enter some routes with high 
profitability by providing one-stop routings (i.e., the positive relationship between one-stop 
variable and prices). However, it is unclear how these carriers attract sufficient passengers to 
order these one-stop tickets along with sacrificing the longer travel time, given the short distances 
between airport-pairs in Europe. Future research may therefore focus on examining how FSCs in 
Europe set pricing strategies on one-stop connecting flights by considering factors such as, travel 
time, the competition from nonstop flights (Lijesen et al., 2004) and passengers’ willingness to 
pay (Garrow et al., 2007). 
Following Vowles (2006) and Zhang et al. (2013), this paper contributes to the literature in the 
field of examining pricing strategies in the hub-to-hub markets. Even though applying different 
geographical regions as empirical study, this paper confirms Zhang et al. (2013)’s finding that 
hub hierarchies characterizing route structure should be incorporated in a pricing model to better 
control inter-HH route heterogeneity. Furthermore, comparing the model and results of current 
paper with Zhang et al. (2013) also suggests that the determinants of FSCs’ airfares seem to be 
different in the European and the US markets. First, the monopolistic effects on airfares 
diminishing as the hubs become less crucial in a carrier’s network occur in the US case, but not in 
the Europe. This may reflect the fact that a multi-hub-and-spoke network configuration has been 
deeply established by the US FSCs, while the European FSCs are still on their way to construct 
such a network practice via alliances or mergers. Second, the extent that LCCs’ direct presence 
reduces FSCs’ prices is less in Europe than in the US (9.7% versus 49%). We also do not find a 
significant impact of the competition from LCCs at secondary airports on FSCs’ fares in Europe, 
which contrasts the US case.  
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